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Concentration of Physician Services Across Insurers
and Effects on Quality
Early Evidence From Medicare Advantage
W. Pete Welch, PhD,* Aditi P. Sen, PhD,† and Andrew B. Bindman, MD‡
Background: A growing proportion of Medicare beneﬁciaries is
covered by private insurers through Medicare Advantage, yet little is
known about how these plans are structured in terms of relationships
with physicians and implications for quality of care.
Objective: The objective of this study was to assess whether greater
physician concentration of services across insurers was associated with
higher quality in Medicare Advantage (MA), overall and particularly
among MA insurers serving a high proportion of vulnerable enrollees.
Research Design: A retrospective cohort design with regression analysis.
Data Sources: The primary dataset was 2014 MA encounter records
submitted by insurers to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, covering 600,329 physicians across 119 insurers. These
data were merged with Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
data on MA contract quality rating as well as physician character-
istics in the Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty ﬁle.
Measures: Two measures were generated to capture the concentration
of physician services across insurers: the percentage of a physician’s
Medicare services which was through MA (MA penetration); and the
percentage of a physician’s MA services with a speciﬁc insurer (insurer
share of MA services).
Results: Greater MA penetration and insurer share of MA services
were each associated with higher MA plan quality. The relationship
between insurer share and quality was stronger in contracts with a
relatively high percentage of disabled enrollees.
Conclusion: Greater physician concentration of services across MA
insurers was associated with a higher quality of care overall and
especially among vulnerable enrollees.
Key Words: Medicare, quality, insurance, physicians, health care
organization
(Med Care 2019;57: 795–800)
The percentage of Medicare enrollees covered by privateinsurers through Medicare Advantage (MA) has grown
from 17% in 2000 to 33% in 2017.1 Over this period, research
has shown that MA plans tend to provide lower-cost care
compared with traditional Medicare (TM), due to both lower
utilization and lower prices.2,3 Further, there are spillovers to
TM; in areas with higher MA penetration, TM spending is
lower.4,5 Because of a lack of enrollee-level data, there is
relatively little work comparing outcomes in MA and TM,
however, 1 study shows that MA enrollees receive less in-
tense care and have better outcomes than TM enrollees in 3
postacute care settings.6 Evidence of lower costs and better
outcomes raises an important question: What strategies are
MA plans employing to provide lower cost, higher quality
care? One strategy available to insurers is integration with
physicians.
At the extreme, insurers and physicians may be jointly
owned, for example, a hospital might offer its own health
insurance plan. Existing evidence shows that this type of
integration was associated with higher quality as well as
higher premiums.7,8 There may, however, also be less formal
relationships between insurers and physicians that could be
considered a form of integration. For instance, if a physician
provides 50% of her MA services through 1 insurer this may
not reﬂect formal ownership but the physician may still have
a closer relationship with that insurer than if she had only
10% of her MA services with that insurer. Like more formal
vertical integration, a greater concentration of physician
services with a given insurer may facilitate improvements in
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quality (eg, because insurers are more likely to invest in
quality initiatives or due to enhanced care coordination),9 yet
there is little evidence on the extent of these relationships and
implications for outcomes.
In this study, we explored whether higher levels of
physician service concentration with a particular insurer are
associated with differences in quality. Using newly-available
data on MA encounters (analogous to claims), we measured the
percentage of a physician’s services provided to MA versus TM
enrollees and, within MA, to enrollees of a given insurer and
assessed the relationship between this “service concentration”
and MA quality. Further, we evaluated whether the association
between service concentration and quality is different among
plans that serve a high proportion of at-risk enrollees. At-risk
enrollees may especially beneﬁt from concentrated insurer-
physician relationships if these relationships facilitate manage-
ment and coordination of care. If so, this type of integration
may be 1 mechanism by which the performance gap between
MA plans with high-share and low-share of socially at-risk and
medically at-risk enrollees can be narrowed.
A deeper understanding of how MA insurers are improving
quality, particularly for vulnerable enrollees, will be important for
physicians who already contract with and are considering con-
tracting with MA, and for policymakers given the rising percent-
age of Medicare beneﬁciaries receiving coverage through MA.
METHODS
Study Period, Population, and Data
We used newly-available data on MA “encounters”
submitted by insurers to the Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services (CMS) to study 334 MA contracts in 2014.
Like TM claims data, encounter data contain enrollee iden-
tiﬁer, diagnostic codes, and the national provider identiﬁer
(NPI) of the billing physician. The building block of both
claims and encounter data are “line items” which account for
each service a patient receives (henceforth services). Each
service is associated with a service code, date of service, and
NPI of the rendering physician. Multiple services may be
associated with the same claim, for example, a claim might
include 2 services: an ofﬁce visit and an x-ray. We linked
encounter data to information on participating physicians
(based on NPI), including volume of TM services, geographic
location, and specialty, from the Medicare Data on Provider
Practice and Specialty.
For each service, we also know the enrollee’s MA plan.
We link the plan to the associated contract and insurer be-
cause our key outcome variable, MA quality, is available only
at the contract level. At the top of the hierarchy of MA,
entities are insurers such as UnitedHealthCare. Each insurer
might have several contracts [eg, a Health Maintenance Or-
ganization (HMO) contract], and each contract might have
several plans (eg, a special needs plan). We obtained contract-
level data on the type (eg, HMO), enrollment, and quality
from publicly-available CMS ﬁles and the percentages of
disabled and dual enrollees from the Medicare Master Beneﬁciary
Summary File.
To create our analytic sample, we included evaluation
and management services, procedures, imaging, and nonlaboratory
tests (57% of MA services) provided by physicians (84%).
At the contract-level, we excluded 353 of 721 contracts,
with 15.5% of enrollment, because of a lack of 2016 star
ratings (largely because those contracts had exited MA by
2016; 2016 ratings are based on 2014 performance, the year
of our encounter data). An additional 19 contracts (3.7% of
enrollment) were excluded due to a low number of services
per enrollee. Our ﬁnal sample was 334 contracts with 78%
of MA enrollment across 119 insurers, incorporating 249
million services provided by 600,329 physicians. For addi-
tional details on data and sample construction, please see
the Appendix (Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.
lww.com/MLR/B852).
Physician Service Concentration
We constructed 2 measures to capture the level of
service concentration between an MA insurer and associated
physicians (ie, the percentage of a physician’s services pro-
vided to enrollees of a given insurer). First, we measured the
“insurer share of MA services” as the percentage of each
physician’s MA services provided under contracts offered by
a given MA insurer. Second, we measured “MA penetration”
as the percentage of each physician’s Medicare services
provided through MA (vs. TM) as the insurer’s inﬂuence over
physicians depends not only on their dominance of the
physician’s MA services but also the volume of MA services
relative to TM.
Both measures were calculated at the physician-level.
We then created a contract-level average of each measure
across all physicians associated with a given contract. For our
main analysis, these contract-level measures were weighted
by the number of services each physician delivered under that
insurer to more accurately reﬂect the level of service con-
centration between the contract and associated physicians.
For additional details on variable creation, please see the
Appendix (Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.
com/MLR/B852).
Contract-Level Outcomes
Our key outcome variable was 2016 contract-level
overall quality star rating (combining the Part C and Part D
measure scores). The 2016 star rating is based on the per-
formance during the 2014 service year (aligning with our
encounter data). Since 2008, CMS has scored MA contracts
on a scale from 1 star (poor) to 5 stars (excellent) and posted
ratings to assist consumers when choosing a plan. Star ratings
have also been used as a basis for ﬁnancially rewarding high-
performing MA contracts since 2012.
Quality ratings are based on scores on 45 measures
derived from a combination of survey and administrative
data.10 In addition to an overall quality score, measures are
categorized into 9 domains: preventive care, chronic care,
member experience, complaints and improvement, customer
service, and 4 drug domains. Physician-insurer concentration
could potentially be related to both clinical care (eg, im-
proving preventive care) as well as administrative processes
(eg, improving customer service). Thus, in our analyses, we
used the overall quality score, scores for each domain, and
Part C and Part D summary scores as outcome variables.
Welch et al Medical Care  Volume 57, Number 10, October 2019
796 | www.lww-medicalcare.com Copyright © 2019 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright r 2019 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.
Analyses
Our unit of analysis was the contract. We used ordinary
least-squares models with state ﬁxed effects to assess the rela-
tionship between contract quality and MA penetration and in-
surer share of MA services. Regressions were weighted by MA
enrollment to give more weight to contracts with relatively high
levels of MA business. In our primary speciﬁcation, the out-
come variable was the contract’s total performance score and
the key explanatory variables were insurer share of MA services
and MA penetration. To assess the impact of insurer-physician
concentration for vulnerable populations, we included inter-
actions between the percentage of enrollees who were disabled
and insurer share of MA services. In all analyses, we controlled
for contract type (HMO vs. other).
We conducted a number of additional sensitivity
checks, including controlling for insurer and market charac-
teristics and employing alternative measures of vulnerable
enrollees. We also estimated several variations of our re-
gression speciﬁcation, including unweighted, ordered logit,
and with the interaction of MA penetration and insurer share
as a measure of overall “insurer afﬁliation.” Further, we used
domain-level quality scores as outcome variables as well as
the Medicare Part C quality score rather than the total score
which incorporates Part D. For detail on sensitivity analyses,
please see the Appendix (Supplemental Digital Content 1,
http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852).
We used Stata, version 13 and SAS, version 9.4 for
analyses. As determined by the Common Rule, policy re-
search at the US Department of Health and Human Services
that use secondary, administrative, and deidentiﬁed data for
program analysis does not require approval by an institutional
review board or informed consent.11
RESULTS
MA Contract Characteristics in 2014
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the contract-level
variables in our analysis. The average overall star rating was
4.0. The average insurer share of MA services was 48% and
average MA penetration was 47%. The average enrollee’s
contract had just over 20% of enrollees originally eligible for
Medicare due to disability. (Some contracts had up to 80%
disabled enrollees, but the majority of MA enrollment was in
contacts with under 30% disabled enrollees as shown in
Appendix Figure 1, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://
links.lww.com/MLR/B852.) HMO contracts comprised over
60% of MA enrollment. Insurer share of MA services and
MA penetration varied across contract types, with the highest
levels of concentration in HMOs (Appendix Table 1, Sup-
plemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/
B852).
Insurer-Physician Concentration and Quality
Figure 1 shows the unadjusted relationship between our
concentration measures and MA quality ratings. Each
observation represents a contract; contracts are color-coded
and shape-coded to represent their star rating and each
contract’s location in the ﬁgure represents its insurer share of
MA services and MA penetration. Lower quality plans (< 4
stars) are clustered in the lower-left corner of the ﬁgure,
reﬂecting lower insurer share and MA penetration, on
average. In contrast, contracts with 4.5 and 5 stars are more
concentrated to the right and upper right of the ﬁgure,
indicating higher concentration between insurers and
physicians in these plans. Indeed, both MA penetration and
insurer share of MA increased monotonically with a contract
star rating (Appendix Table 2, Supplemental Digital Content
1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852). Figure 1 also illustrates
the positive correlation between MA penetration and insurer
share, which is ∼0.3.
Table 2 shows estimates from the formal test of the
relationship between concentration and quality. In our basic
speciﬁcation [column (1)], insurer share of MA services and
MA penetration were signiﬁcantly and positively associated
with a star rating, the percentage of enrollees who were
disabled was negatively associated with contract quality, and
whether or not the contract was an HMO contract was not
signiﬁcantly associated with star rating. Our estimates suggest
that an increase in insurer share of MA of 1 SD (just over
22%) was associated with an increase in contract quality of
0.09 stars. An increase in MA penetration of 1 SD of (just
over 19%) was associated with an increase in contract quality
of 0.33 stars. Sensitivity checks of our main results are shown
in Appendix Tables 3A–3C (Supplemental Digital Content 1,
http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852) and are generally con-
sistent with our main results.
The interaction between insurer share and the percentage of
beneﬁciaries who were disabled was signiﬁcantly and positively
TABLE 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Variables Description Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Overall quality star rating Star rating reported in 2016, based on performance in 2014 4.0 0.6 2.5 5
Insurer share of MA services Percentage of MA services delivered to enrollees in insurer’s contracts 47.5 22.2 3.6 99.0
MA penetration Percentage of all (MA and FFS) services delivered to MA enrollees* 46.7 19.5 12.9 97.1
Percentage of enrollees disabled Percentage of enrollees whose original source of eligibility was a disability 21.4 12.0 2.0 93.0
HMO (%) = 1 if contract type if HMO, 0 otherwise 65.3 47.6 0.0 100.0
N= 334 contracts (12.6 million enrollees). Summary statistics are weighted by enrollment. “Insurer” refers to MA parent organization.
*MA insurer share and penetration are calculated for each physician; the mean is calculated at the contract level, weighting by each physician’s number of services delivered to
enrollees in the insurer’s contracts.
FFS indicates fee-for-service; HMO, Health Maintenance Organization; MA, Medicare Advantage.
Source: Authors’ analysis of Medicare Advantage Encounter Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), CMS public use ﬁles on contract quality,
Medicare enrollment ﬁle, and Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty.
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related to quality [Table 2, column (2)]. Figure 2 illustrates this
interaction between insurer share and disability by showing how
quality varies by insurer share for contracts with a high (90th
percentile) versus low (10th percentile) percentage of disabled
enrollees. For both low-disability and high-disability contracts,
higher insurer share of services was positively associated with
quality, but the effect was larger in high-disability contracts. For
low-disability contracts (dashed line), the difference in quality
score between contracts with low versus high-insurer share was
only 0.06 stars (4.22–4.28) compared with a difference of 0.44
stars (3.58–4.02) for high-disability contracts.
Said another way, the quality differential between low-
disability and high-disability contracts was smaller among
plans with more concentrated insurer-physician relationships
than among those where physicians’ services are spread
across many insurers (represented vertically in Fig. 2). An
increase in insurer share of 1 SD was associated with an
increase of 0.06 stars for contracts that covered enrollees at
the 10th percentile in terms of the percentage who were
disabled. In contrast, for contracts that covered enrollees at
the 90th percentile in terms of the percentage who were
disabled, a 1 SD increase in insurer share was associated with
an increase of 0.21 stars, a larger effect than the maximum
adjustment (0.131) that CMS makes in terms of payment for
contracts with vulnerable enrollees.12
In our domain-level analysis, we found that the rela-
tionship between MA penetration and quality score was mixed
across domains; it was positive for “Managing Chronic Con-
ditions” and “Member Experience,” but negative for “Customer
Service,” and insigniﬁcant for the other 2 Part C domains
(Appendix Table 4, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://
links.lww.com/MLR/B852). The relationship was mixed for the
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FIGURE 1. Quality Star Ratings as a Function of Medicare Advantage (MA) Insurer Share and Penetration, 2014. Each symbol
denotes an MA contract (N=334 contracts, 12.6 million enrollees). Source: Authors’ analysis of Medicare Advantage Encounter
Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and CMS public use files on contract quality.
TABLE 2. Association Between Contract-level MA Penetration
and Insurer Share of MA and Contract Quality, 2014
Regression-adjusted
Association With
Contract Quality
(1) (2)
Contract-level Variable Overall
By Percentage of
Disabled Enrollees
MA penetration 1.57 (0.19)* 1.53 (0.32)*
Insurer share of MA services 0.36 (0.14)** −0.18 (0.28)
MA penetration×percentage of
enrollees disabled
1.61 (1.47)
Insurer share of MA×percentage
of enrollees disabled
2.65 (1.12)**
Percentage of enrollees disabled −1.70 (0.19)* −3.18 (0.71)*
HMO −0.05 (0.05) −0.09 (0.05)***
Constant 3.50 (0.08)* 3.72 (0.14)*
N 334 334
R2 0.736 0.742
Contract-level regression. Dependent variable: contract-level star rating. SEs are
represented in parentheses. State ﬁxed effects not shown.
The term “Medicare Advantage” is sometimes used broadly to include other types
of private plans, most of whose enrollment in is 1876 cost contracts. Cost contracts (eg,
Kaiser Permanente Mid-Atlantic States) are required to submit encounter records and
compete for beneﬁciaries based, in part, on published quality star ratings, but their
payment is unaffected by their quality rating. We report regression results including
these cost contracts, but the results are insensitive to their inclusion.
HMO indicates Health Maintenance Organization; MA, Medicare Advantage.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
Source: Authors’ analysis of Medicare Advantage Encounter Data from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), CMS public use ﬁles on
contract quality, Medicare enrollment ﬁle, and Medicare Data on Provider Practice and
Specialty.
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Part D domains. The direct relationship between insurer share
of MA and quality was also mixed or insigniﬁcant across do-
mains. As in the analysis of overall quality, there was a sig-
niﬁcant and positive associated between the interaction of
insurer share of MA and the percentage of enrollees who are
disabled and quality in the nondrug clinical domains, “Staying
Healthy,” and “Managing Chronic conditions” domains. Effects
of this interaction were statistically insigniﬁcant in the non-
clinical domains of the Part C score and all Part D domains.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has 4 key ﬁndings. First, in 2014, physicians
participating in MA provided, on average, close to half of their
Medicare services in MA versus TM. Second, participating
physicians had, on average, close to half of their MA services
with 1 insurer. Third, we found that MA contracts characterized
by more concentrated physician services had higher star ratings.
We found that an increase in MA penetration of 1 SD was
associated with a greater increase in contract quality than a 1 SD
increase in insurer share of MA services (0.33 vs. 0.09 stars).
This result suggests that physicians with relatively greater
participation in MA overall focus more on quality, perhaps due
to the role of quality incentives in the MA program more
broadly. There is an additional effect of physician engagement
with a speciﬁc insurer (captured through the insurer share
measure), however, it is relatively smaller than the effect of
overall MA participation. Finally, we found that the impact of
insurer-physician concentration on star ratings was especially
pronounced in contracts with a high proportion of disabled
enrollees.
Improved quality in contracts characterized by more
concentrated physician services could be due to a number of
factors. These relationships may facilitate improved care
coordination for patients (eg, reducing duplicative testing),
alignment of insurer and physician incentives to promote
quality improvement and cost savings, as well as streamlined
administrative functions. Our results support the idea that MA
penetration and insurer share may be associated with im-
provements in both clinical and nonclinical domains. For
example, we found that insurer share was associated with
better performance on cancer screenings and diabetes care
among contracts with a greater percentage of disabled
enrollees. MA penetration was positively associated with
performance on clinical chronic care measures and drug
safety as well as member experiences. Future work providing
more insight into the mechanisms driving the relationship
between physician-insurer concentration and quality will be
important.
From the physician’s perspective, a greater concentration
of services may be accompanied by increased investment in
technology and other tools for patient and cost-management.
Further, physicians may be more likely to respond to insurer
incentives and goals if the majority of their business is with that
insurer than if they work with multiple insurers. From the in-
surer’s perspective, greater concentration with afﬁliated physi-
cians may give the insurer more control over services and costs.
More concentration would also allow insurers to accrue the full
beneﬁts of any cost savings or quality improvements that occur
due to changes in practice. Thus, insurers may be more likely to
invest in quality improvement processes and programs and any
such initiatives may be more effective.9
The closer insurer-physician relationship that may result
from more concentrated services may also enable other in-
novations, such as improvements in health information
technology, patient and practice management, more efﬁcient
referral practices, and other structural changes (eg, integration
between inpatient and postacute care) which may result in
quality improvement. Physician payment may also vary be-
tween contracts with greater service concentration. Although
CMS makes fee-for-service payments directly to physicians in
TM, MA insurers have control over contracting with afﬁliated
physicians. Evidence suggests that there is considerable varia-
tion in these arrangements, including subcapitation and the use
of value-based payment models, and these models may be more
widespread in settings characterized by more concentrated in-
surer-physician relationships.13 In turn, this type of payment
may be associated with improvements on star ratings. Un-
fortunately, we lack systematic data on contracting and man-
agement innovations and whether they are more common in
settings with closer insurer-physician relationships.
Limited evidence exists on how MA insurers are
achieving quality for Medicare beneﬁciaries. Our study is
consistent with and builds on existing research. Our ﬁndings
align with evidence that insurer-physician integration based
on common ownership is associated with improved quality.7,8
Common ownership is a useful measure because it recognizes
a formal relationship which gives the insurer direct control
over afﬁliated physicians. Our study builds on this work by
examining insurer-physician relationships deﬁned by practice
patterns rather than formal arrangements. This measure
allows us to consider a continuum of insurer-physician
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FIGURE 2. Impact of Medicare Advantage (MA) Insurer Share
in High versus Low-Disability MA Contracts, 2014. Calculated
based on regression results in Table 2. Low-disability contracts
defined as those with disabled enrollment at the 10th
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Advantage Encounter Data from the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), CMS public use files on contract
quality, and Medicare enrollment file.
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integration based on how much of a physician’s services are
provided to enrollees of a given insurer. A service-based
measure is supported by evidence that physicians tailor their
practice patterns towards the patients and incentives of the
dominant insurer with which they contract.14,15
Our study was subject to several limitations. First, be-
cause they are new and have not yet been used for research,
there is a concern that encounter data may not be as complete as
TM claims or may have other issues with validity. MedPAC
has documented variation in the reporting of certain kinds of
encounter data, but for 2014, the year which served as the basis
of our study, MedPAC found that 97% of contracts reported
data on physician services to CMS. To judge the quality of
encounter data, MedPAC used Healthcare Effectiveness Data
and Information (HEDIS) data as a benchmark against which to
compare MA service counts. However, the 2 datasets deﬁne
encounters differently (Appendix, Supplemental Digital Con-
tent 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852) and when we use fee-
for-service claims per enrollee in TM as a benchmark, we ﬁnd
found similar rates of services per enrollee in MA encounter
records (Appendix Table 5, Supplemental Digital Content 1,
http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852).
Second, we were limited to contracts with available star
rating data. The majority of the excluded enrollment due to
missing rating data was in 2014 contracts that had exited MA
before 2016 when the ratings were made public. If the ex-
cluded contracts were disproportionately low-quality, their
omission could bias our results. Over 80% of this enrollment,
however, was in the national insurers of UnitedHealthcare,
Humana, and Aetna, none of whom lost market share in 2016.
This suggests that the exclusion of contracts was due to
within-insurer consolidation across contracts rather than the
selective exit of contracts. In sensitivity analyses, we found
that results are consistent when we include 100 of the missing
contracts that were missing 2016 ratings, using their 2014 or
2015 star rating instead (Appendix Table 3C, Supplemental
Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B852).
Third, we observed only the Medicare portion of a
physician’s practice. If there are spillovers or other forms of
interaction between Medicare and non-Medicare activities
within a physician’s practice, we may not have a complete
understanding of the effects of insurer-physician relation-
ships. Finally, we did not assess the cost implications of
greater service concentration. Integration may enable reduc-
tions in duplicative testing, more efﬁcient management, and
lower administrative costs, allowing medical groups and in-
surers to lower costs (and potentially pass these lower costs
on to customers). If improvements in quality depend on
capital investments (eg, in information technology), however,
or integration results in enhanced market power, this could
result in higher costs to consumers.16 Indeed, previous evi-
dence has shown that common plan-physician ownership was
associated with higher premiums as well as higher quality.7,8
Going forward, Medicare is increasingly incorporating
new models of care that focus on coordinated care across the
spectrum of care settings and payment for value rather than
volume. With its innovations in delivery (ie, through private
insurers receiving quality-based rewards) and payment (ie, cap-
itation), MA offers a useful perspective on the potential effects of
such alternative models. Further validation of the MA encounter
data will be valuable as these data are increasingly used for
research and policy. In this study, we found that greater con-
centration of physician services with an insurer was associated
with increased quality. Further, our results suggest that this type
of integration may be especially beneﬁcial for vulnerable pop-
ulations. A more in-depth understanding of relationships between
insurers and physicians and how they can promote quality will be
important in MA as well as in other settings.
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